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Abstract 
 
The essay looks at the Prodi Commission (1999-2004) in the context of the institutional 
balance in the European Union. Not only did Prodi come into office at a time of 
unprecedented weakness of the Executive, but the Commission operates within a 
changing institutional equilibrium, one made more precarious by the shifting political 
disposition of the Member States.  
The paper is divided in two parts. Part I sets the broad institutional scenario. It argues 
that the institutional set-up of the Union is best seen as one form of “balanced 
government”, one, however, fundamentally different from the constitutional system of 
“checks and balances”. When looked at comparatively, the European Commission turns 
out to be a weak institution, vulnerable to pressure from the Council and the Member 
States. The Commission has none of the political legitimacy and social foundation 
which allow a constitutional power, say, in the USA, to resist external political pressure. 
Part II reviews some of the items in Prodi’s agenda, including the administrative reform 
perhaps the most successful operation during Prodi’s tenure, the contribution of the 
Commission to the Intergovernmental Conference of 2000 and to the Treaty of Nice, 
and the White Paper on European Governance. The Executive contribution to the 
“constitutional” Convention and the changing relations with the European Parliament 
are also discussed in Part II. A few remarks in Prodi’s record in carrying out his agenda 
of “reform and change” conclude the essay. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The record of the Prodi Commission may be fittingly analyzed in terms of the dialectic 
between attempts at systemic change and systemic resistance. While under previous 
Commissions, including Delors’s, change has been incremental following the ebb and 
flow of European integration, the nomination of Prodi signaled the need for a new 
departure. The conditions under which he was chosen in 1999 after the resignation of 
Santer, a trauma which has left an enduring mark on the morale of the institution; the 
inclinations of the man as former prime minister of Italy Prodi as a sort of prime 
minister of Europe: these and other factors shaped an agenda premised on the 
reassertion of the European Executive through internal reform and the restoration of the 
Community method. 
A wider spectrum of forces beyond the vicissitudes of Union life shaped the context in 
which Prodi was to operate. The conjuncture surrounding the Commission in the five 
years of its existence (1999-2004) has been one in which the reassertion of state power, 
occasionally bordering on disrespect for the Union Executive, the growing 
“parliamentarization” of Community life and demands for democratization were 
imposing constraints working not infrequently at cross-purposes. To this, one should 
add the weakening of the Paris-Bonn axis perceived by Prodi’s staff as a serious 
complication in the political steering of Europe. 
The pattern was familiar except that it manifested itself in markedly conflictual tones: 
the pattern, that is, of institutions bent on nurturing a more integrated Union and new 
loyalties, on the one hand, and forces resistant or openly hostile to change, on the other 
hand, a trend of which the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) is the most recent manifestation. No 
greater contrast exists, for instance, between current attempts at watering down the 
Stability Pact and Prodi’s effort to make economic policy a truly Community matter.  
The paper looks at Prodi's agenda in the context of the institutional structure of the 
Union. Not only did Prodi take office at a time of unprecedented political crisis of the 
Commission; more importantly, the Executive operates in the context of an unstable 
institutional equilibrium, made more precarious by the changing disposition of the 
member states to “pool their sovereignty” in designated areas. 
The essay is divided in two sections. Part I sets the broad institutional scenario. It argues 
that the institutional set-up of the European Union is best seen as one form of balanced 
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government, one, however, fundamentally different from “checks and balances” as 
practiced in the USA. While  “checks and balances”  rests  on the equal legitimation of 
constitutional  powers  all of which emanate, either directly or indirectly, from the 
people, institutional balance in Brussels reflects the heterogeneity of the Union, 
“peoples and  states”,  and the lack of a shared political finality for the same Union.  
Hence an institutional set-up which is hierarchical rather than truly balanced (Fabbrini, 
2004) with the member states in firm command.    
Based on documentary evidence and direct observation1, Part II analyses some of the 
major themes in the Commission's agenda, including internal reform, the Executive's 
contribution to the Treaty of Nice and changing relations with the European Parliament.   
A few remarks on Prodi’s record in carrying out his agenda conclude the paper. 
2. Institutional balance - how it operates in Brussels 
 
In its modern form, balanced government is an 18th-century invention, the most 
celebrated version of which is the doctrine of separation of powers. It is through the 
separation of powers, variously construed, that balanced government has become a 
constitutional reality in a number of countries. In its essence and original intent, the 
doctrine was meant to ensure responsible government and public freedom. The 
partitioning of state powers, fostering mutual control and cooperation among the various 
branches of government was meant to serve the basic goals of the liberal state: the rule 
of law and freedom from arbitrary domination.  
Separation of powers is a concept not easily adaptable to Brussels. Born out of efforts to 
change state power into a  non-tyrannical form of government (Montesquieu, Madison), 
the doctrine prescribes distinct spheres of competence among the  various state powers  
within a homogeneous   political entity, that is, the territorial state attributes none of 
which pertain to a supranational  regime in fieri like the Union.      
The Union departs from this model in a number of ways, which may be briefly 
summarized. 
                                                          
1 Much of the empirical evidence in this essay is drawn from a study conducted while I was a guest of the 
Prodi's Cabinet in 2000 and 2001. I would like to thank Romano Prodi and the heads of his Cabinet at the 
time of my research, David O'Sullivan, Michel Petite and Stefano Manservisi, for giving me access to the 
Commission. The members of the Cabinet were equally generous with their time and advice.  
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Firstly, the design for European unification, original and unprecedented as it is, does not 
alter the fact that we are dealing with a Union of states gradually evolving towards some 
kind of supranational entity. European institutions bear witness to the tension inherent 
in such a project states bent on pooling portions of their sovereignty, especially 
ambiguity as to the ultimate locus of sovereignty (states, peoples, what?). As in any 
newly-created center of authority, authority has to be generated and accumulated before 
it can be carved out - a predicament under which interinstitutional relations tend to be 
less of opposition than of cooperation against centrifugal forces. The priority, in other 
words, was to set out and shelter the Community mode from other methods of 
international action, especially intergovernmental cooperation. The end result of such 
contrasting pulls controversial distribution of power and the need for a common 
front has been a pattern of institutional relations which may be called “antagonistic 
collaboration”. 
The system is such that the institutions of the Union: 1) must cooperate in order to bring 
about action; 2) in so doing they bring to the process the views of their respective 
constituencies governments, peoples, etc.  as well as their own vision of the 
European construction, and in which 3) they relate to each other on the basis of 
interlocking rather than clearly distinct attributes. The sharing of power in Brussels 
bears some resemblance to “consociational democracy” (mutual protection through the 
joint exercise of authority). The European Commission, in particular, is not a decision-
making body and has little “exclusive” competence, even though it has been given the 
unique prerogative to propose legislation. Thus, while there is interinstitutional balance 
in the European Union, it does not follow neat functional lines, a point which I shall 
illustrate later on with some practical examples. 
Secondly, as is the case for federal states, yet with none of the rigor to be found in the 
latter, the most basic dimension is territorial: it pertains to the division of competence 
between Brussels and the member states. Not only is the Union premised on the 
principle of attribution, whereby it has authority exclusively in the sectors and within 
the powers recognized by the Treaties, but the respective role of the Union institutions 
and of the member states is subject to periodical redefinition. Institutional stability is not 
a trait of the system. On this score, it is only fitting that the principle of institutional 
balance, not to be found in the original Treaties, has received formal recognition in the 
Protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality appended to the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(1997). Even within this cadre, the question of “competence” remains a touchy matter 
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never to be treated lightly in Community discourse. The Commission, in particular, is 
quite resistant to any attempt at formally circumscribing its powers for the good reason 
that it has few “exclusive” powers. Confusion and ambiguity provide the needed 
flexibility to an uncertain and evolving structure. 
Thirdly and relatedly, in a constitution in which there is a variety of legal bases on 
which to ground legislative proposals with changing distribution of authority and  
voting methods depending on the procedure invoked (unanimity, qualified majority, 
etc.), institutional balance cannot be a uniform principle valid throughout the system. 
Institutional balance in, say, foreign policy operates quite differently from law-making 
in Community matters. This is, incidentally, still the case under the Lisbon Treaty, even 
though the treaty was intended to formally abolish the “pillar” structure of the Union. 
Furthermore, over time legislation in the same policy area, say, the institution of 
agencies, has come to be based on shifting legal ground and different institutional 
procedures (agencies were introduced ex art 308 and through Council Regulations in the 
1990's, through Council and Parliament Regulation in the 2000's). 
It is hardly surprising, then, that legal base challenges have been increasingly used to 
negotiate institutional balance via the Court. As one study notes, “The wider legislative 
role afforded the European Parliament, the increase in (the number of) legal bases, and 
the divergence between the Member States over the Community's role… moved the 
question of legal basis into a key role in the institutional balance debate” (Cullen and 
Charlesworth, 1999: 1246). 
Lastly, there is the question of the status of the principle under discussion in Union 
jurisprudence. As noted, absent in the original Treaties “institutional balance” entered 
primary Community law as late as the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). As in other important 
matters, it was the European Court of Justice which opened the way. In a judgment of 
1956 (Meroni) later to be known as the Meroni doctrine, the Court ruled that “there can 
be seen in the balance of powers which is characteristic of the institutional structure of 
the Community a fundamental guarantee granted by the Treaty to the undertakings… to 
which it applies” (quoted in Lenaerts and Verhoeven 2000: 3).  
The construction by the Court in the Meroni case covers what may be called the legal 
interpretation. The aim is to set limits to the delegation of discretionary powers, prevent 
institutional usurpation and ensure respect for the rule of law. 
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Politically, “institutional balance” has a broader meaning: it refers to a specific mode of 
reaching decisions and conducting business in the Union. On this view, it is meant to 
ensure that Union action is the result of the cooperation between the Union institutions 
and respect for the role assigned each of them by the Treaties. It ensures, in particular, 
the pursuance of concerted policies under the rule of law (unlike, one might add, the 
intergovernmental method which allows for joint action outside of any jurisdictional 
scrutiny). As a general principle of the Union legal order enforceable before the Court, 
“institutional balance” may be seen as the juridical counterpart to the “Community 
method” (see section on the Community method) 
The Court of Justice has provided a more complete reading in the Chernobyl case 
(1990)2, the other major pronouncement of the Court on the matter, ruling that 
interinstitutional balance is a “system for distributing powers among the different 
Community institutions, assigning to each its own role in the institutional structure of 
the Community and (in) the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community” 
(quoted in Lenaerts and Vorhoeven, 2002: 4). 
I shall pause for a moment and offer some examples as to how “balance” operates in 
Brussels. They are drawn from observations made in the course of a study on the 
Commission and in one DG, Enterprise (see footnote 1). 
The Council is a living example of balanced government at work. Whenever acting in a 
legislative capacity, the presence of the pertinent Commissioner reminds the observer 
that l) Ministers of the member state Governments, whatever their degree of agreement, 
can do nothing in the absence of a  legislative proposal from the Commission, nor 2)  
may override the Executive without the assent of the attending Commissioner, who has 
the faculty to withdraw the item  whenever he/she deems  the changes to be seriously at 
variance with the  original  intent of the proposal. The Commissioner has greater liberty 
whenever decisions are made on the basis of qualified majority (QM). In such cases, she 
may manoeuvre to bring about a voting majority or a blocking minority, as the case may 
be, by accepting or rejecting amendments - one further reason for the Commission to 
press for the widest possible use of QM. 
A second example concerns the European Parliament (EP). Severely restricted in its    
role until the Single European Act (1986) empowered the EP with what were to become 
co-decision powers, it is now a full player perceived with considerable fear by the 
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Executive. The parliamentary liaison officer in the de Palacio Cabinet, commenting on 
the change, noted that while Strasbourg received little attention in the early l990's, it is 
now a central preoccupation of the Commission. 
I shall come back to the role of Parliament. It suffices to note here that the EP has 
induced in the European Executive, at least under Prodi, a degree of political deference 
which reflects as much the weakness of the Executive after Santer as the growing clout 
of the Assembly. 
The way in which the internal acts of the Commission are generated also bears witness 
to a pattern of negotiated agreements. One instance is the interservice consultation, 
arguably the most important bureaucratic procedure within the Executive. It is based on 
the notion that  each legislative proposal, or act, from any Service of the Commission 
must be ultimately submitted to all the other DGs, with each Commissioner and his/her 
Head of Cabinet entitled to a veto d’attente  until a satisfactory version  has been 
worked out. This results in many texts being drafted and redrafted, not infrequently up 
to five or more versions of the same document. Unanimity is not required, but no item is 
submitted to the Commissioners until the interservice exchange generates a consensus 
solid enough in the judgement of both the Secretary General and the President's Cabinet 
to justify its inclusion in the agenda of the College. There are exceptions: sensitive and 
divisive dossiers are sometimes settled at the College level once all the other layers of 
negotiation have been unsuccessfully tried out. (One such case was the White Paper on 
chemicals). 
In the nature of things, as the dossiers move along from the administrative to the 
political level they become increasingly “politicized”. Prodi tried to counteract this 
tendency by laying greater stress on the DGs' responsibility to settle as many dossiers as 
possible at the interservice level, with limited success. Once the Members of the 
College and their Cabinets are drawn into the discussion, they inject into the 
deliberation overtly political concerns including national sensibilities, which make the 
governments of the member states, or more accurately the countries of each 
Commissioner, vicariously present in the decision-making of the Commission. Nor, it 
should be noted, is this objected to. There is evidence to suggest that top officers, 
including members of President Prodi's Cabinet, view such inputs as a vital component 
of intra-institutional pluralism. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
2 The question arising in Chernobyl was whether the European Parliament had a right to bring an action 
for annulment against acts of the Council or the Commission. See Lenaerts and Verhoeven (2000). 
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No list of Community practices can plausibly omit the committee system (advisory 
Committees, Comitology, committees of scientific national experts and the whole 
panoply of similar bodies operating in Brussels). Not only, as one officer told this 
writer, are advisory committees part of the “power base” of the Commission to which 
they provide advice, negotiated political consensus and expertise; more importantly for 
my argument, the proliferation of such bodies combining consultation and deliberation 
shows how the “balance of power” notion in the EU reaches deep into European 
societies and state life, well beyond the formal perimeter of the Union's institutional 
system (De Burca, 1999). 
 
2.1 The doctrine of separation of powers in comparative perspective 
 
So far, I have dealt with institutional balance in the EU providing some examples as to 
how it operates. There are, however, broader questions to be answered: under which 
conditions can a branch of government resist pressure? And is such balance, assuming 
one to emerge, the product of interaction among  institutions of comparable authority or 
the result of a system  pluralistic yet hierarchical? Also, how does  the distribution of 
powers  link up with democratic accountability a key question in view of the fact that 
the doctrine under discussion has become a basic tenet in American liberalism 
(Madison), just as   institutional balance in Brussels is deemed to be essential to the 
democratisation of the  Union. 
One recent study (Fabbrini, 2004) has convincingly argued in favour of a broader 
approach to the Union, one which sees its institutional structure as part of a larger 
family  rather than as a “unique” case. Following Fabbrini, this section looks at the 
political system of the European Union in the light of comparable systems such as the 
USA, perhaps the purest incarnation of “separation of powers”. This might better clarify 
the specific nature of interinstitutional balance in Brussels and the social foundation of 
its system of authority. 
Institutional balance may be found in a number of settings the common denominator of 
which is the idea of balanced government. This leads naturally to Montesquieu, the first 
to formulate the doctrine of separation of powers. 
It is worth recalling that the prime concern of Montesquieu was with political freedom 
rather than with the structure of government. His interest in the constitution of England 
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proceeds from his celebrated definition of liberty: “Une constitution peut etre telle que 
personne ne sera contraint de faire les choses auxquelles la loi ne l'oblige pas, et a ne 
point faire celles que la loi lui permet”. Freedom, then, is not independence or even the 
privilege of living under laws of one's own making; it consists in being free from the 
abuse of state power. This can be achieved, Montesquieu argued, “through a distribution 
of authority whereby the legislative power and the two branches of the executive the 
power to make peace and war and the power to judge, respectively are administered 
by different classes of people” (my translation from the French). 
In its pure form, the doctrine of Montesquieu can hardly work since it calls for “an 
organic division of government in three branches” each of which would be confined to 
the corresponding function. Furthermore, “the persons who compose the three 
branches…must be kept separate and distinct, no one being allowed to be at the same 
time a member of more than one branch” (Lenaerts and Verhoeven, 2000). Thus 
conceived,   there would be little interaction, little mutual control and problematic 
cooperation. To make the doctrine   a working rule “it has proven necessary to combine 
the principle of separation of powers with other political ideas, such as the idea of 
balance and, in particular, the concept of checks and balances”, the central feature of 
which is that “each branch of authority can fulfill its tasks…only when at least one other 
branch cooperates to that effect, thus controlling the use the first makes of its power” 
(Lenaerts and Verhoeven, 2000: 9).   
On this view,   not separation of functions but the impossibility for any institution to act 
alone and the correlative need for concerted action are at the root of control and 
restraint. I shall come back to the idea of checks and balances at the end of this section. 
A second problem, besides the notion of balance, relates to the social foundation of the 
various branches of government, that is, the constituencies, if any, for which they speak.  
Montesquieu broached the problem in his discussion on the legislative branch, for 
which he favored a structure providing two distinct chambers, for the nobles and the 
people, respectively, with the faculté d'empecher (or veto power) vested in the former 
and the faculté de statuer in the latter. More vague were his considerations on the 
social bases of the executive, about which he says that power is best vested in one 
person, the monarch, rather than many, for the sake of efficiency.  
Elaborating on the point, one study notes that there is “a deeper strand in Montesquieu's 
call for a division of governmental power…. Each institution represents a particular 
 9
interest and particular views. The balance of powers is to reflect the ideal balance 
between the different interests within a society”, adding that “the ideal of separation of 
powers… links up with the republican ideal that sees the democratic process as an 
institutionalized, and thus civilized, dialogue between different interests, which is 
capable of uncovering the common good for all” (Lenaerts and Verhoeven, 2000: 9; cf. 
Craig, 1999). On this reading, Montesquieu is linked to Machiavelli and his idea of 
republican government, according to which freedom for all is best safeguarded if the 
various “humours” (or classes) in the population are given an institutional role in the 
government of the city.  
Thus, a new element enters the theory: the search for the common good.  “In negative 
terms”, one legal scholar notes (Craig, 1999: 54), “institutional balance would serve to 
prevent tyranny…In positive terms, such a balance would help to ensure a deliberative 
democracy within which the differing 'constituencies' which make up civil society” 
engage in a debate meant to identify and pursue the common interest (cf. Eriksen, 
Joerges and Neyer, 2003).  
The reinterpretation of Montesquieu in terms of the republican ethos speaks to our 
problem since the whole process of European integration may be said to consist in the 
attempt to frame common interests and common policies in the midst of centrifugal 
forces. It is not fortuitous but intrinsic to the political logic of European integration as it 
unfolded after 1945, that the notion of general interest, by now a relic in national 
debates, is at the center of Commission rhetoric and the major justification of its 
powers.  
Once “balance of power” is seen in conjunction with social representation and the 
representation of the major interests in society as a prerequisite for the pursuit of the 
common good the institutional structure of the EU appears in a new light.  
For one thing, the orientation to the common good and the institutional machinery 
meant to uncover the “general interest” are as basic to the “Community method” as they 
are to the republican model, a point to which I shall return shortly. On this view, the 
Community model links up with the republican tradition, whose twin pillars are 
institutional balance and democratic deliberation geared to the pursuit of the public 
interest (Craig, 1999: 54). 
The problem is whether the Commission has powers commensurate to its rhetoric and 
the political clout to use such powers. One should not forget that the idea of a 
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government reflecting the major group in society is contingent on the latter's capacity to 
have their voices heard through appropriate institutions. A number of characteristics in 
the EU system makes this prospect unlikely or highly problematic. 
Firstly,   the Union “does not rest on an organic separation of powers but on a balanced 
interaction between representatives of various interests”. The legislative function is 
jointly exercized in most matters by Parliament and the Council, yet the European 
Parliament has no right to propose legislation. And although the Commission has the 
quasi-monopoly of legislative initiative, a unique prerogative and its major source of 
political leverage, it is not free to frame implementing legislation except under the 
supervision of the member states acting through “comitology”. As for the Council, in 
part the Upper House, in part the authority which ensures ultimate political direction, it 
is accountable to the European Parliament only to a limited degree. Any attempt made 
by the Commission to introduce a neater division of labor among Community 
institutions, for instance by revising comitology and the exercise of executive 
responsibility, has met with strong resistance from member states and the Council. 
The absence of a genuine separation of powers may be traced   to the dual nature of the 
Union, as a union of peoples and states. This results in heterogeneous institutions, with 
the Parliament speaking for the peoples, the Council representing the governments and 
no agreement as to which is the ultimate locus of sovereignty. Heterogeneity is 
compounded by the differentiated bases of political legitimation. The European 
Parliament draws its credentials from direct popular mandate even though it remains a 
far cry from a full-fledged parliamentary assembly. The Parliament has, in particular, 
refrained from claiming for itself the right to propose legislation in order, in part, not to 
unbalance the system and erode the unique position of the Commission (Craig, 1999: 
56). As for the Council, its role in the institutional scheme “can be defended most 
fundamentally because the democratic legitimacy of the Community is founded upon its 
states as well as its peoples”. It also draws credibility from the fact that ministers 
represent democratically elected executives and from the nature of the Community as an 
international agreement (Ibid.). 
It is enough to stroll in the halls of the Lepsius building, the home of the Council in 
Brussels, to sense the powerful effect of such combination of factors. Nothing can rival 
the   self-assurance and sense of righteousness of officers acting from a national popular 
mandate. The exercise of responsibility within a shared Union has attenuated but not 
drastically altered this perception. In particular, the Council seems to view the European 
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Parliament as a sort of outlandish institution within a political entity which for all its 
peculiarity partakes of the nature of an international organization. As for the 
Commission, it suffers from the shortcomings to which I now turn.     
The notion that modern democratic government rests on elective representation and that 
the representation of all major groups is a prerequisite for the pursuit of the common 
interest, calls into question the bases of Commission authority. In a representative 
scheme the Commission is, strictly speaking, an anomaly. It is vested with the 
institutional mission to serve the European interest precisely because it has no special 
constituency to serve a heavy burden for any Executive. (All of the above is a 
quotation from, or a paraphrase of Lenearts and Verhoeven, 2000: 10). 
The reasons for such an anomaly are well known. In the conditions under which the idea 
of a united Europe was launched after 1945, none but officers freed from a national 
mandate were deemed capable of acting on behalf of common goals. The institutional 
design of the Commission proceeds from such imperative. Conceived as a non-
representative body, framer of the general interest and guardian of the Treaties, the 
European Commission embodies a non-electoral type of representation which has a long 
history but no modern legitimation (Pitkin, 1967). Hence its originality but also 
vulnerability vis-a-vis those institutions which rest on various forms of democratic 
mandates, that is, the European Parliament and the Council. The current debate on the 
democratic deficit, greater transparency and the like does nothing but magnify the 
fragility of the Executive and the sense of insecurity of many of its officers. 
Lenaerts and Verhoeven (2000: 10) point to a third peculiarity of the Union: “One could 
complement this list (of institutional traits) by referring to the many instances wherein 
European law accomodates for the participation of functional interests in European 
governance”. This, again, is due in part to the peculiar status of the Commission. 
Deprived of a parliamentary majority for guidance, the Commission draws inspiration 
and direction from a number of sources including, crucially, groups in civil society, 
especially business. They provide the “intelligence”, expertise and expectations   
without which the Commission would be incapable of formulating   plausible lines of 
action. 
In view of the above it comes as no surprise that the Commission is a major target of 
lobbying and the center of wide-ranging consultation (cf. Graziano, 2002). Interaction 
with groups is both informal and formal. Formal consultation is usually through 
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advisory committees set up by the individual DGs. They give voice to the clientele of 
each Service, of which they constitute an essential interlocutor. How to harmonize 
sectorial pulls and the overall European interest in the day-to-day administration of 
dossiers is a further major challenge for the institution and its officers. 
 
To sum up. The constellation of factors reviewed, particularly the question of the 
legitimacy, formal powers and political clout of the Commission, explains why the 
Commission is more often than not incapable or unwilling to resist political pressure, 
especially when mounted by powerful member states. Paolo Ponzano (1996; 2000), for 
many years the representative of the Commission in the COREPER I, has documented 
the declining autonomy of the institution vis-a-vis the Council and other actors. Such 
dependency affects both the manner in which the right of initiative is being exercized 
and the content of legislation. Legislative proposals from the Commission are 
increasingly in response to external solicitation, especially from the Council or the 
various Governments. Although such requests are not binding they are politically 
irresistible. Equally if not more important is the fact that the Council has been 
increasingly operating on the basis of intergovernmental deals rather than a 
“communitarized” institution. As Ponzano shows, the timidity with which the 
Commission has wielded its powers in Council deliberation has much contributed to 
such a state of affairs. 
Things work very differently, to wind up our discussion, in a full-fledged system of 
checks and balances. A brief reference to the USA brings out the contrast. 
For  the framers of the American Constitution, the basic problem was not dissimilar, 
mutatis mutandis, from the one we find in Machiavelli and other republican blueprints: 
how to protect the public interest (as conceived by the propertied minority which 
drafted the Constitution) and the rights of individuals from the oppressive power of 
factions, especially majoritarian factions, the most dangerous  since they could avail 
themselves of the majoritarian principle basic to democratic rule (Graziano, 2001). The 
solution has been a republic organized around multiple and autonomous constitutional 
institutions, which, however, must cooperate with each other in order to bring about 
public action. The extension of the Union to thirteen states in 1787 was supposed to 
work in the same direction, by making factions more difficult both to forge and operate. 
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What is unique to the US and cannot be replicated in an international organization is the 
existence of a demos in the name of which the republic was founded and is governed.  
As Fabbrini (2004) makes clear, the ingenuity of the American constitution consists in 
the fact that the will of the people is tapped through differentiated elections and finds 
expression in institutions none of which can issue a vote of no-confidence vis-a-vis the 
other. National elections for the choice of the president (every four years), state 
elections for the Senate with a partial renovation of the Upper House every two and 
local elections for the House (a two-year mandate), provide the foundation for 
institutions which rest on an equal yet differentiated basis of popular legitimation.  
Nor is this the end of the story, since in addition to periodical elections there is a higher 
law, the constitution, which guarantees the equilibrium between popularly elected 
institutions and between the latter and non-elected bodies like the Supreme Court. So 
that, Fabbrini (2004) concludes, the government is not the President but the ensemble of 
constitutional bodies. 
The gist of the argument is that for a system of checks and balances to emerge and 
function, the various branches of government must be buttressed by a constituency 
invested with the authority to delegate power, which in a democracy is the popular will. 
In the USA there is one, broad constituency, that is, the “people” which is called upon 
to express itself through a variety of elections, at different territorial levels and at 
different points in time. The system is such that each institution originating from the 
people (or in the case of the Supreme Court, originating from the Constitution) has the 
power and authority to resist pressure from the others. This, and none else, is the social 
and political foundation of checks and balances. 
By contrast, in the European Union authority stems from a variety of sources which are 
not only irreducible to each other but in competition as bases of legitimation. The 
“neutral” yet intensely political role of the Commission stems from this lack of 
agreement on a clear, shared ordering among the competing sources of political 
legitimation. 
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2.2 The “Community method” as an alternative form of balanced 
government 
 
 
In spite of the spurious form it takes in Brussels, or perhaps because of that, institutional 
balance is a working principle jealously advocated by those which stand to lose the most 
by the undiluted exercise of   state power, that is, the Parliament and the Commission. 
There is not one single version, each institution subscribing to its own interpretation. 
Controversy and confusion are made worse by the current “three-pillar structure”, each 
of which has its own institutional balance. 
To circumscribe the subject we may say that l) institutional balance is at the core of the 
“Community method”; b) that the Commission is the staunchest supporter of such a 
method and that c) it subscribes to a vision of the future premised on the extension of 
the Community model to the ensemble of the Union agenda, with the qualifications to 
be made below.   
Prodi offered his own version in a speech made before the European Parliament on 
October 3, 2000. (All the quotations in this paragraph are from this text).  
Built around the institutional triangle of the Council, Parliament and the Commission, 
the Community method has proved extremely successful: “All the lasting achievements 
of the European Union from the single market to the euro, including four successive 
enlargements, have been the product of our unique system, based on a delicate balance 
between the Community institutions”. The originality of the system, Prodi added, “lies 
without doubt in the Commission and its right of initiative”: 
“The Commission is the melting pot into which the various national interests and 
tensions are poured, and from which emerge proposals that seek to reconcile these often 
conflicting interests. In this way it provides not only the synthesis and analysis of the 
problems at issue but also a starting-point for negotiations in which, once national 
differences have been aired, the common European interest can be identified.” 
The Executive is, however, part of a broader system: 
“The European interest is the product of an institutional system in which Parliament, 
Council and the Court of Justice play an equally decisive role”.  “Any weakening of 
these institutions weakens the whole”. The Union derives its democratic vitality from 
the direct legitimation of the European people and the legitimation of the Members 
States. “Enhancing the intergovernmental model at the expense of the Commission but 
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also, ultimately, of the Council would therefore undermine the democratic nature of the 
whole European structure”. As we shall see, the need to enlist the support of the Council 
and the Permanent Representations was one important consideration in the preparation 
of the speech.  
A second trait on which Prodi never tired to insist is this: the Union conforms to “the 
principle of a Community based on the rule of law, respect for which is guaranteed by 
the Court of Justice”. Coupled with the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
in the Constitution, the rule of law makes the Community a veritable Community of 
right, in contrast, again, to what is obtained in intergovernmental cooperation and in the 
sectors which have not been “communitarized”. As an example of the latter, Prodi cites 
the “Third Pillar” (justice and home affairs): “even the deliberations  of the fifteen 
Justice Ministers on such sensitive issues as penal law and police cooperation escape the 
scrutiny of Parliament and the Court of Justice”.  
Prodi offered one final argument. As the Union departs from such unique system, it runs 
the risk of fragmentation. A prime example is the office of High Representative for 
foreign and security matters: “This model confuses the roles of the Council and the 
Commission in a way that could ultimately jeopardize both struts of the institutional 
system and exclude Parliament from any effective power”. Hence the need to “absorbe” 
the Office into the Commission “with a special status tailored to the needs of security 
and defense”, a provision which has found its way into the Treaty of Lisbon. 
The need for coherence in the realm of economic policy is no less compelling. The 
current situation, Prodi noted, is “indecisive and muddled. The Central bank is 
independent, but unlike every other protagonist on the world economic stage it is not 
flanked by a stable economic policy body representing the… the economic strategies of 
the Union and its members.” Here again the solution does not lie in the creation of one 
more High Representative, this time for economic policy, but in making the 
Commission “acting on a mandate from the Council…the voice of the Union's 
economic policy”.    
One word about the background to the speech. Written by Michel Petite, the Head of 
Cabinet and architect of the operation, the idea emerged in a situation in which at the 
eve of the Nice Council, a growing number of politicians including Chirac and the 
German Foreign Minister Fischer were offering their views on the future of Europe. 
But, as Petite notes, “Prodi was not free to tell his own utopia as Chirac and Fischer had 
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done” without departing from his institutional role. By focusing on the Community 
method   Prodi could offer his own vision while remaining true to his duties. The timing 
was also important: the speech had to be made early enough so as to impact on the Nice 
Council (December 2000), yet not before the Danish referendum on the euro, out of 
respect for the Danish voter.  
The pronouncement must be equally seen in the context of the political isolation of the 
Commission at the time.  In April 2000 Prodi had been the object of vitriolic attacks 
from Der Spiegel, Le Monde and The European Voice questioning his capacity for 
leadership. One headline in Der Spiegel labeled Prodi “The loneliest man in Brussels” 
(April 3rd, 2000). Characteristic of the “siege mentality” of the Cabinet at the time is the 
fact that it saw in the campaign not just criticism from the press but an assault on the 
Commission engineered by a number of Foreign Ministries in the member states. 
Petite made sure that the operation would find a receptive audience by sounding out 
several actors, including the various Commissioners some of whom had been reported 
as “plotting” against the President, and the parliamentary groups. The choice of the 
venue fell on Parliament, a potential ally. Special attention was paid to the Council and 
to the Permanent Representations on the theory that they, too, stand to loose by the 
erosion of the Community system. Finally, the High Representative for Foreign Policy, 
Solana, a key target in the attack on fragmentation, was informed and personally 
reassured. 
One lesson from the episode is that the notion of institutional balance, far from being a 
shared principle, is part and parcel of a vibrant dialectic. The Commission frames it in 
terms of the “Community method” in which it sees the quintessence of the “orthodoxie 
communautaire”.  
3. The Prodi Commission. The man and the agenda  
 
                                                             “Prodi is still having trouble understanding that he and his 
Commissioners have only as much weight as the Heads of State or Government allow them to have” 
 Der Spiegel, April 3, 2000 
 
By summer 2002, half way through his mandate, Prodi felt reasonably reassured after 
considerable initial problems.  The period 2000-2002 had been one of political difficulty 
for the Commission, strain and isolation for the President. Resistance and foot-dragging 
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were to be expected as the result of plans, to be described below, to “reconstruct” a 
discredited institution. But personal factors played a role. Three factors, in particular, 
added to the problem: l) a style of leadership perceived as both ambitious and hesitant, 
possibly a reflection of the Italian penchant for compromise; 2) some ill-conceived or 
premature initiatives like Qaddafy's invitation to Brussels; 3) a limited capacity for 
communication. One should add a less than faultless “maitrise des dossiers”, which 
cast doubts on Prodi the administrator.  
At mid-term, things looked better. As Prodi told this interviewer in July 2002, “the 
worst is over”. Trusted men had been put in key positions3, attacks from the press had 
somewhat abated, while a number of  goals basic to the Commission had been achieved 
or were in the process of being realized, including the introduction of the euro, 
negotiations on enlargement and the launching of the Convention. These were part of a 
broader agenda which will be discussed in this section. 
Out of the enormous amount of activity and ideas which substantiate the work of an 
institution as complex as the Commission over several years, it is possible to select, I 
believe, a number of statements illustrative of its general line of action. Five items, I 
believe, were at the core of Prodi’s agenda on institutional matters. They are: the 
strategic objectives 2000-2005; the wide range of measures known as internal reform; 
the contribution to the Intergovernamental Conference in 2000 and to the Treaty of 
Nice; the White Paper on European governance; and the contribution to the Convention. 
                                                          
3 Three positions are central to the strength of the Commission President: Secretary General, Head of 
Cabinet, Director of the Legal Service. By mid-2002, all three posts were held by officers whom Prodi 
could personally trust: David O'Sullivan, his former Head of Cabinet, had been appointed Secretary 
General; Michel Petite, also a former Head of Prodi's Cabinet, had been made Director of the Legal 
Service while Stefano Manservisi, a long-time associate of the President had moved from the position of 
Deputy Head to that of Chef de Cabinet. 
The Forward Studies Unit came to play an equally important role. Prodi changed the unit into the Group 
of Presidential Advisors (GOPA) which was placed under his own authority rather than of the Secretary 
General’s as had been the case with the Cellule de Prospective.  
Much could be said of the complex pattern of cooperation and rivalry within the circle of Presidential 
officers. Two remarks will be offered here. 
The first concerns the office of Secretary General (SG). The SG is at the same time the head of the 
Commission bureaucracy and the chief administrative advisor to the President, briefing him before each 
meeting of the College - two roles which may come into conflict especially under a President who intends 
to reform the Services. Moreover, the President is heavily dependent on the Secretariat General due to the 
paucity of the Presidential staff - basically 9-10 members of the Cabinet plus the presidential advisors. 
His Cabinet could not possibly discharge its many duties, including the setting up of dossiers, political 
coordination and mediation, without the support of the SG, especially the expertise of   officers in 
“Coordination”, arguably the most important direction within the Secretariat General.  
The second point has to do with potential rivalry between the GOPA and the Cabinet. One area of friction 
has been speechwriting. The Cabinet was concerned that not infrequently the main input for important 
statements was coming from the GOPA, a body with access to the President but no operational 
responsibility. The close personal relationship between the head of COPA and Prodi did not make things 
easier. I should add that over time relationships within the Presidential circle improved remarkably. 
 18
These items will be discussed in turn. The changing relations with Parliament will be 
discussed at the end of the paper. 
 
3.1 Initial steps  
 
Innovation has the greatest chance at the inception of a mandate when power positions 
are not yet crystallized. This has been the case in 1999 in the wake of the power vacuum 
left by Santer and before the parliamentary vote ratifying the nomination of Prodi. In 
this interval, a few men David O'Sullivan; the future head of DG Enterprise Fabio 
Colasanti and other close associates of the President designate laid the  foundation for 
the new Executive along two lines: l) redefinition of the institutional role of the 
Commission vis-à-vis Council and Parliament; 2) a clearer separation of politics and 
administration in the functioning of the Executive4. The idea underlying the latter aim 
was that, in order for the College to be freed of petty matters and solely concerned with 
political direction and responsibility, the maximum amount of   bargaining was to be 
conducted at the DGs level and only genuinely political conflict passed onto the 
political leadership. 
Other measures taken in the interregnum included: l) the reorganization of the “foreign 
service function” in three DGs, RELEX, Trade, Enlargement  and the launching of  DG 
Enterprise charged with industrial policy; 2) relocation of the offices of the 
Commissioners, previously  housed in the Breydel, in the building of the  DG for which 
they were assigned responsibility; 3) down-sizing of the Cabinets to six members and 
internationalization of their composition so as to make them  organs of the Commission 
rather than partisan arms of the Commisioners; 4) creation of a Media and 
Communication Service as the collective voice of the Services5. 
 
3.2 The team 
 
Crucial to the project was the quality of the team. On the whole, Prodi's College may be 
rated, I believe, of a rather high quality, well-balanced politically and relatively well-
balanced in terms of gender (five women out of twenty), with some three-fourth of the 
members former ministers6.  Prodi claimed that the nomination of the Members of the 
                                                          
4  Prodi's speech before the EP, May 4,1999 
5 Prodi's speech in the EP, July 21, 1999 
6 Prodi's speech in the EP, July 19, 1999 
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College was made with his agreement as President designate, a claim which, if true, 
must have helped the homogeneity of the team. Certainly no open conflict erupted 
during parliamentary confirmation of the kind which marred the birth of the Barroso 
College.  Each of the nominees subscribed to the obligation to resign if so requested by 
the President, a commitment which went beyond Prodi's formal powers at the time.   
What may be averred on the basis of the meetings I was able to observe, is that the 
College tended to operate rather consensually with ample delegation of authority to each 
Commissioner and no great internal division. 
Whether Prodi actually exercized his powers to the full extent of his authority is more 
debatable. My impression is that, all in all, his has been a relatively relaxed leadership 
meant more to orient than guide, to mediate than to decide. One should add that an 
Italian President in Brussels has none of the diplomatic support which, say, a French 
President of the Commission might enjoy. All of the above should be taken with caution 
since Prodi has a grasp on problems, men and dossiers greater than what seems to be 
visibly the case. 
Most of the statements I reported on the reshaping of the Executive are from speeches 
before the European Parliament, towards which Prodi took a number of exacting 
engagements to be examined below. It suffices to say here that the two vice-presidents 
of the Commission, de Palacio and Kinnock, were given responsibility, respectively, for 
relations with the EP and internal reform, a fact, Prodi noted, which “reflects the 
importance I attribute to these two sectors”7. 
 
3.3 The Strategic Objectives of the Commission 2000-2005 
 
Early in 2000, Prodi presented the strategic objectives of the Administration before the 
EP8. As the name indicates, they are designed to set the broad priorities on the basis of 
which to frame, or at least rationalize, Commission action. I will comment on the 
political assumptions underlying the document, the four policy areas chosen and, 
briefly, on one such priority, enlargement. The rest of the essay will discuss the 
institutional aspects of the agenda. 
                                                          
7 Prodi's speech in the EP, July 9, 1999 
8 Prodi's speech in the EU, “A Project for the New Europe”, February 15, 2000 
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Prodi believed that European integration was entering a new stage: while the 1980's 
witnessed the development of the single market and the '90's the advent of a common 
currency, the new challenge consisted in the transformation of the Union into a truly 
political entity. In his judgment, the new frontiers of European integration were Justice 
and home affairs, a common foreign policy, cooperation in the realm of defense and 
“the crucial question of fundamental political values”. This explains the importance he 
attached to institutional reform and the convening of the “constitutional Convention”, a 
procedural innovation which he strongly supported and, as he claims, invented. 
A related idea was the necessity to reappraise the overall structure of the Union. 
European integration had developed through a “geological succession of layers” with no 
“master plan” to direct the project. There was a pressing need to bring political 
coherence to the fabric, refocus the Union and set up “a new and more democratic form 
of partnership among the different levels of government” member states, regions and 
civil society9. It would be wrong, however, to interpret such a plea for change as a call 
to redesign competences. While favoring decentralization, the Prodi Commission has 
been quite jealous of its own prerogatives an orientation confirmed by Prodi's  explicit 
reference, as an example of the new approach, to competition. While the administration 
of policy in this area left room for national authorities and decentralized jurisdictions, 
the policy itself was to remain the sole responsibility of the Brussels Executive. 
A third theme, one which Prodi never tired of insisting upon in the five years of his 
mandate, was the need to open up the process to civil society. The White Paper on 
European Governance, to be discussed below, mentioned for the first time on this 
occasion (February 15, 2000), was to be inspired, in part, by this very concern.  
Here again, rhetoric and reality should not be confused; or better said, Prodi's genuine 
reformist impulse as a center-left politician should be kept separate from what the 
institution and the bureaucracy were prepared to give up. I have, for instance, the most 
vivid recollection of the dismay caused in a number of functionaries by Prodi's plans for 
greater transparency in the Union, including the setting up of registers of documents 
open to public scrutiny. Nor is this simply a re-run of the conflict between politics and 
administration. The fact and the complication is that the Commission is a political 
bureaucracy, with  the rigidities of an administration and the need for strategic 
manoeuvering typical of a government. “Space to think”, that is, a sphere impervious to 
                                                          
9 Prodi's speech “A Project for the New Europe”, cit. 
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external scrutiny, has been the defensive response of the establishment when confronted 
with the President's intention to open the process to “civil society”. 
This is the political backdrop against which the Commission set up its strategic 
objectives   for 2000-2005, which consisted of four priorities: promotion of new forms 
of European governance; the need to stabilize the continent and strengthen Europe's 
voice in world affairs, enlargement to the East being one essential step in this direction; 
a new social and economic agenda, including the introduction of the euro; a better 
quality of life, including security against crime as well as in the realm of food and air 
transportation.  
The administrative reform of the Commission was part of the package, indeed “an 
essential pre-condition for realising our vision of Europe”. 
Most of the discussion below refers to point 1 (European governance). Here I shall very 
briefly comment on enlargement, one of the strategic goals of the Prodi administration. 
My impression is that the Commission, while carrying out its role as negotiator with 
considerable skill, did not think through the implications of enlargement including 
uncertainties as to the “boundaries” of Europe and the identification of new candidates. 
Probably what is driving the process are diplomatic and national security imperatives, 
especially in the case of Germany, rather than   well thought-out policies reflecting the 
priorities of the Union.       
Our institutional perspective, however, seems to provide one plausible explanation. 
There seems to be at work a strong institutional impulse, or institutional logic, making 
for the unconditional support of enlargement. It has to do with the fact, I believe, that in 
a Union whose heterogeneity and fragmentation is bound to increase with the inclusion 
of new members, the power of the bureaucracy is also bound to grow. The Commission 
is the center of gravity in such a dispersed world, proposing new legislation, 
administering programs and an expanding budget, and its power and authority are 
bound to augment as the sphere of action broadens. One proof a contrario is the critical 
reaction to current plans within the College to cut for itself a less ambitious role. A 
political bureaucracy cannot but be unhappy when told, as the current Commissioner for 
the Internal Market McCreevy is reported to have said, that the new aim is to initiate as 
little legislation as possible. 
One final remark. One diplomatic advisor to Prodi characterized the negotiations with 
the ten candidate countries as one more proof of the merit of the Community method. 
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There is reason in such a view. By centralizing negotiation in the hands of one actor, 
that is, the Commission acting on a mandate from the Council, this approach has made 
it possible to replace the plethora of bilateral dealings of each member state with each 
applicant country with one coordinated process. The result has been simplification, to be 
sure, but also a pattern of negotiation structured around a uniform grille of chapters, as 
well as uniform parameters for evaluating progress towards accession. 
 
3.4 Internal reform 
 
Fraud, corruption and nepotism, the charges that brought down Santer, were only one 
trigger of the administrative reform of the Commission. The root of the problem and the 
general direction of the response reflected, above all, a situation in which the 
Commission had been given growing responsibilities unmatched by adequate resources. 
In the process, other systemic problems causing inefficiency and irregularities like 
career patterns and financial controls came into the picture and were made part of the 
reform. But the moral tone surrounding the operation, the resentment and amertume of 
a large body of officers cannot be understood unless we recognize that the bureaucracy 
felt as much responsible for the wrongdoing of some of its members as the victim of a 
system in need of serious change. 
It is to the credit of Prodi, Neil Kinnock, the Commissioner in charge of internal reform, 
and the whole Commission that a crisis induced by parliamentary censure was changed 
into a challenge the result of which has been the first shake-up of the European 
bureaucracy in forty years. As the communication from Mr Kinnock outlining the 
reform10 notes with some reason, “Administrative Reform will help the Commission to 
fulfill its institutional role as the motor of European integration. It is thus a political 
project of central importance for the European Union”. (Hereafter I shall refer to the 
White paper Reforming the Commission as the “Kinnock document”). 
It would be impossible, and unnecessary, to analyse in any detail a plan made up of 
some one hundred actions spanning almost three years, perhaps the most demanding 
operation in terms of time and energy under the Prodi Administration. The more modest 
aim is to illustrate the spirit of the plan and the sectors singled out for reform. 
                                                          
10 Reforming the Commission. A White Paper - Part I. Communication from M. Kinnock in 
agreement with the President and Ms. Schreyer, 1 March 2000 
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The measures fall into three distinct groups: priority setting and efficient use of 
resources; human resources and career development; financial control and the 
repression of fraud.  The whole is prefaced by a chapter on professional ethic (“A 
culture based on service”) which is at the origin of strict codes of conduct introduced in 
the course of 2000-2001 for the personnel, political and administrative alike. 
Underlying the measures on priority setting is a new system known as Activity-Based 
Management, whereby policy priorities and the corresponding resources are planned 
together at every level in the institution. The operational mechanism is a new procedure 
called Strategic Planning and Programming (SPP). Without going into technicalities, it 
suffices to say that SPP has two aims, one of which is priority setting. The procedure is 
meant to induce the Commissioners and the services under their jurisdiction to come up 
with a list of priorities spanning a period of 2-3 years. The focus is on new programs 
rather than on ongoing operations, with the aim of programming the activity of the 
Commission more selectively and over a longer span of time than in annual budgeting. 
The other goal of SPP has been to counteract through middle-range planning pressure 
from without, especially from the EP and the Council, so as to restore a measure of 
autonomy and flexibility to executive action. 
Goals and resources may also be matched, the Kinnock document states, though 
“externalization”, a term which  covers a number of options including devolution to 
Community bodies like the agences d'exécution, decentralization to national public 
authorities as in the area of competition and contracting out to private-sector 
organizations,  quite a common practice in the field of development aid. In order to 
guide the Commission on externalization, Kinnock set forth a “basic principle” 
according to which “regulatory or negotiating activities and actions to allocate funds 
involving the exercise of discretionary power can only be invested in public 
administrations” and cannot be delegated. 
This is not the place to dwell on the complex question of agencies, which are of many 
different descriptions. I would  simply recall that the principle set down by Kinnock 
no delegation of authority whenever la puissance publique is involved generated 
heated discussions within the Commission on the question of whether to delegate, in 
which area and how, including the structure of the agencies and the composition of their 
governing bodies. This has been especially so in the case of the new independent 
agencies (not to be confused with agences d'exécution) such as the European Aviation 
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Safety Authority, the European Food Authority and the Authority on maritime security, 
all of which have been instituted in recent years. Although the composition of their 
boards varies, they are generally made up of representatives of the member states, of the 
Commission and Parliament and in some agencies of interested parties including 
industry and consumers.  
A second set of measures set forth in the reform plan concerns the personnel and career 
development. The basic concept is that a function-based bureaucracy should be turned 
into a performance-oriented administration for the sake of efficiency and equity. The 
former system, based on self-contained categories of personnel (A,B,C,D), relied 
“heavily on qualifications and training at the moment of recruitment” and took too little 
account of qualifications acquired afterwards, as well as of  skills and  tasks actually 
performed. The Commission “proposes to develop a…more linear career structure 
without categories” so as to make career advancement dependent on merit more than on 
seniority. An annual assessment is introduced for all, including Directors and Directors 
General. 
Never an easy task, the introduction of new staff regulations was made more difficult    
by their being proposed by Neil Kinnock, a former labor leader from Britain suspected 
of propounding an Anglo-saxon philosophy centered on performance in lieu of the 
French model based on seniority, and of doing so with a view to ingratiate British 
public opinion not a model of support for European integration. 
The last set of reforms pertains to financial control. The system of financial 
management was to be gradually changed from one of “ex-ante visa” administered by 
the Financial Control DG to ex-post evaluation exercised within each DG. Director 
Generals were to be made directly answerable for adequate internal control in their 
respective departments. For this, they could count on assistance from a newly-founded 
Central Financial Service. The aim was “to create an administrative culture that 
encourages officials to take responsibility for activities over which they have control 
and (give) them control over activities for which they are responsible”, including  
financial resources. The Community financial interests were to be protected through a 
variety of means including an independent Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). 
Enough has been said for the reader to grasp the main thrust of the reform. I should only 
add that for the reform to succeed, interinstitutional cooperation is needed. For one 
thing, as Kinnock noted, “the Commission will have to refuse (new) tasks when it is not 
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properly resourced”. On the other hand, in their capacity “as legislators, the Council and 
the European Parliament will handle the revision of the Financial Regulations and the 
Staff Regulations” to bring them into line with the provisions of the reform. 
The upshot of the argument is that “internal reform” is neither a merely internal act nor 
a purely administrative operation.  It consists in a wide range of political measures with 
profound implications for the functioning of the Union. 
 
3.5 The contribution of the Commission to the Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) on institutional reform and to the Treaty of Nice11 
 
 
2000-2004 was a period of almost uninterrupted Treaty revision to which the 
Commission contributed with specific proposals. The discussion largely centered on 
democratization, representation and efficiency in a Union facing its most ambitious 
enlargement. This section deals with the IGC on institutional reform (February-
December 2000), the outcome of which was the Treaty of Nice.  
The argument may be organized around four topics debated in the IGC and of central 
concern to the Commission: 1) composition of the Commission; 2) extension of 
qualified majority (QM); 3) weighing of the votes in the Council; 4) reinforced 
cooperation. Other issues include the composition of the Court and the status of the 
charter of fundamental rights.       
As the avis of the Commission submitted to the IGC makes clear (see footnote 11), 
enlargement poses a dilemma to the Executive: how to include new members without 
endangering   collegiality. Collegiality requires that each Commissioner participates in 
the making of decisions on an equal footing irrespective of nationality. This, the avis 
notes, is the basic source of legitimation in an institution which does not emanate from 
the popular vote. From this angle, the Commission is a bureaucracy which “reflects” the 
national components while pursuing the general interest of the Union. On the other 
hand, in an enlarged College consensus is problematic because of size and due to the 
absence of the factors which assure cohesion in national executives, namely, the 
government/opposition divide.  Cohesion is based on political, often personal, chemistry 
within the College and Treaty obligations.   
                                                          
11 The document on which this section is based is Com (2000) 34, Adapter les institutions pour réussir 
l'élargissement. Avis de la Commission, January 26, 2000 
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Hence the two options offered the IGC: a smaller college based on rotation or an 
inclusive one headed by a more authoritative president. It should be noted that within 
the President's Cabinet the idea of excluding some members was never seriously 
considered. If anything, competition with the Council counseled against exclusion. The 
challenge was to have a representative college yet differentiated from the Council, a 
challenge to which the Commission responded by advocating stronger powers for the 
President.  
On this, and little else, the Commission obtained satisfaction.  The President was given 
authority: l) to decide on the internal organization of the Commission, 2) allocate and 
reshuffle portfolios among the Commissioners, 3) appoint the vice-presidents, and 4) 
request members to resign. These are the changes for which the Executive, especially 
the Legal Service, fought long and hard. 
Of equal if not greater importance has been the question of QM in the Council. In the 
view of the Commission unanimity was to apply only to decisions affecting the 
institutional balance, including comitology, the composition of the Court, the linguistic 
regime and article 308 authorizing actions not contemplated in the Treaty. In all other 
matters QM should be the rule. In fact, QM became the yardstick in terms of which the 
Commission was to evaluate the outcome at Nice. 
Success or failure at Nice depended, in particular, on QM being extended to five policy 
areas thought to be of central importance after enlargement: immigration and asylum; 
structural funds; social security and taxation to the extent that they impinge upon the 
single market, and the common commercial policy including  services and intellectual 
property. 
Without entering into a policy by policy assessment, progress has been modest in all 
these areas. Just as modest have been the results as to the strengthening of the 
codecision powers of Parliament (Governments defeated in the Council would have a 
second chance in Parliament). It should be said that of all the institutions, Strasbourg 
has been the most critical of Nice; one sign of this has been the cold reception given 
Chirac in the course of the parliamentary debate on the outcome of the IGC, as 
compared to the warm welcome given Prodi on the same occasion. 
The Commission was equally defeated on the ponderation of votes. As is well-known, 
the distribution of votes in the Council and seats in the EP was to become the epicenter 
of the struggle, with the various governments searching both for compensation (one 
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Commissioner lost in the College, so many more seats sought in the EP) and ways to 
fence off the numerical preponderance of the new entrants, many of which are micro-
states. For quite some time, the problem with the Council had been the loss of weight of 
the most populous members due to overrepresentation of small countries. (The 
minimum population of the countries whose vote is necessary to form a QM in the 
Council fell from 67.70 of the total population of the Union in 1958 to 58.16 in 1995. 
Cf. Avis cited in footnote 11, p. 23). 
The Commission bypassed the difficulty by proposing, unsuccessfully, the “simple 
double majority”, whereby a Council decision is adopted if backed by the majority of 
states representing the majority of the total population. As for reinforced cooperation, 
the Commission presented a package meant to facilitate recourse to the procedure. It 
included changes in the Council decisions authorizing cooperation from unanimity to 
QM, allowing as few as three states to launch cooperation and making the procedure 
applicable to foreign and security policy. Here too success was nil. 
Reflecting on the over-all approach of the Executive to the IGC one may wonder, in 
conclusion, whether the Commission missed in part the point by arguing in terms of 
function and principle rather than in terms of power. As the Forward Studies Unit 
noted12, “the Commission’s specificity in the negotiation is that it is not primarily 
concerned by power issues but rather by efficiency and practicability of the institutional 
system”. Yet, in Nice we witnessed little more than crude power politics with little or no 
concern for the overall needs of the Union. 
 
3.6 The White Paper on European Governance (2001). An 
interpretation13 
 
 
The White Paper on Governance suffered from overexposure during its gestation and a 
poor reception once it was made public. It remains, however, an important document 
since it was intended as the first comprehensive review of the working of the 
Commission a droit constant, that is, prior to modifications of the Treaties. 
                                                          
12 European Commission, Forward Studies Unit: Note for the attention of the President. Subject: 
Evaluation grid for the results of Nice, December 4, 2000 
13 European Commission, White Paper on European Governance, July 25, 2001. 
The White Paper will be further analyzed in the section on Parliament in connection with the EP's 
reaction to the document of the Commission. 
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The attitude of Prodi has been curious. He had been the father of the document on the 
theory that governance in the Union was in urgent need of rationalization and 
democratization, especially the need to open up the system to civil society. He harped 
on this in all manner and fora well before the content of the document was known. Yet, 
he involved himself quite late in the process when most of the ideas had been vetted and 
options delineated14. Nor his and other Cabinets did much better: as late as February 
2001 one Head of Cabinet admitted that not much was known of the document15.   
Disconnection with the political leadership was one problem. A second difficulty has 
been the manner in which the document was put together. The basic input came from 
twelve inter-service working groups organized around a number of topics (the European 
public space, new forms of regulation, links with civil society, etc.). Thus, a document 
meant to produce an overall reappraisal of the Commission ended up in the hands of 
bureaucrats. 
The exercise was coordinated by a task force headed by Jerome Vignon, a former head 
of the Forward Studies Unit. 
Some of Vignon's insights16 are helpful in understanding the Commission's inner 
reading of the problem. In Vignon's view, over time  there had been a dislocation  in the 
institutional system of the Union which has seriously altered the balance of powers and  
democratic control: the Commission had been too timid in the exercise of its prime 
responsibility; the quality of legislation had suffered as a result of laws assorted with all 
kinds of technical details introduced so as to better control the Executive; the Council, 
especially the General Affairs Council, had not lived up to its task of coordinating the 
Council of Ministers while the European Parliament has been deprived of important 
powers through comitology and other means. Not infrequently, member states have  
been at fault in the implementation of Community law.      
The Commission has suffered the most. Its right of initiative has been severely 
curtailed. One result has been that it has been blamed for problems on which it has little 
control: 
                                                          
14 Commission européenne, Préparation du Livre blanc sur la gouvernance éuropéenne. Comunication de 
M. le President, October 24, 2000. 
Projet de communication à la Commission sur les options de la gouvernance. Pour une gouvernance 
démocratique européenne, February 6, 2001, known as “Interim Report”. 
15 From the notes taken during the Chef-Cab special meeting on the White Paper on governance, 
February 15, 2001 
16 This paragraph is based on  a document intended for the President's Cabinet.  Vignon's document is 
available on request. 
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“lors de la phase législative, Vignon wrote  (cf. note 16), la Commission se trouve en 
grande partie déposseder de sa responsabilité d'initier…une législation. Sur les cinq à 
six cents propositions législatives annuelles de la Commission, seulement l0 % reflètent 
une véritable proposition originale; 20 %…répondent à une requête du Conseil ou du 
Parlement; le reste du droit primaire est induit…par les accords internationaux ou par la 
mise à jour de la législation existante” through comitology, which largely escapes 
parliamentary control.  (Comitology has since been modified so as to allow for a better 
involvement of Parliament). 
Hence the main political conclusion of the White Paper: “At the heart of the proposed 
reform of governance is the refocusing of the institutions the Commission, the 
Council, and the European Parliament” (p. 33, White Paper). This is, in my view, the 
gist of the message: not so much the rhetoric on participation but the need to restore an 
eroded Community method and its intended balance of powers. In this context, an end 
must be put to the dispossession of the Commission's basic rights and   the disjunction 
between tasks and responsibility.  
Some of the changes may be brought about through the rationalization of current 
practices (3.4. Refocused policies and institutions), while more radical adaptations, for 
instance comitology, require the revision of the Treaties   (IV. From Governance to the 
Future of Europe). 
Proposals for changes “à droit constant” include: the need to more clearly identify the 
long-term objectives, to which the Commission responded by introducing the Strategic 
Planning Procedure (see above); to improve the structure and culture of consultation, 
which led the Commission in 2002 to codify the minimum standards of consultation17; 
to simplify and improve the quality of legislation, to which the Executive responded in 
2002 with a specific action plan18. The latter commits the Commission to evaluate the 
impact of Union legislation and choose from a variety of instruments (legislative act, 
co-regulation, self-regulation, open coordination, etc.), a matter to which the White 
Paper devotes considerable attention (3.2 Better polices, regulation and delivery)19. The 
underlying idea is that for the Union to regain efficiency and legitimacy it must make 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
17 Com (2002) 277 Comunicazione della Commissione. Documento di consultazione. Verso una cultura 
di maggiore consultazione e dialogo. Proposta di principi generali e requisiti minimi per la consultazione 
delle parti interessate ad opera della Commissione, June 5, 2002 
18 Com (2002) 278 Comunicazione della Commissione. Piano d'azione “semplificare e migliorare la 
regolamentazione”, June 5, 2002 
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the most judicious use of regulatory tools, the principle of proportionality being as 
strategic today as subsidiarity was ten years ago. 
To focus on the functioning of the institution was not the only option. For an appeal to  
the public to take a greater interest in the Union it was not even  the most logical: people 
have a limited interest in procedures. The alternative would have been to focus on 
policies, a strategy favored by a number of Commissioners. Pascal Lamy, the influential 
Commissioner for Trade at the time, while advocating  a  goal-oriented document 
pointed out  one reason why that option was impractical: the profound division in the 
College as to the  finality of the Union and, no less important,   the  “social model”. It 
should be added, that a different White Paper would have required an entirely different 
mode of preparation, with greater involvement of the political leadership and a lesser 
role for the bureaucracy. 
 
3.7 The Commission and the Convention  
 
 
Prodi claims that he advocated the format of the Convention on the very day that the 
Nice Summit ended - not an implausible claim for an institution which read Nice as the 
final proof of the exhaustion of the intergovernmental method.  
In the run-up to the European Council in Laeken which launched the Convention 
(December 2001), the Cabinet reached two conclusions: firstly, the debate on the future 
of Europe should not be restricted to what was agreed  in Nice20. The other set goal was 
that the Convention should come up with a veritable constitution. “A Project for the 
European Union” of May 200221, sets out the Commission's vision. It is, as such, a 
fitting ending to our discussion on the agenda of the Commission.  
Not a formal submission to the Convention but a contribution to the debate, “A Project” 
is divided into two parts: the policies which European citizens expect from the Union; 
the constitutional treaty. The premise is that Europe needs common policies to confront 
global challenges and that such policies should be pursued through one and only one 
                                                                                                                                                                          
19 The evaluation of the impact of legislative proposals is the object of a specific communication:  Com 
(2002) 276 Comunicazione della Commissione in materia di valutazione d'impatto, June 5, 2002 
20 Traité de Nice, Déclaration sur l’avenir de l’Union à inscrire à l’acte final de la Conférence. 
According to the Declaration, the debate on the future of Europe should focus in particuliar on four 
points: 1) a more precise division of competence between the Union and the Member States; 2) the statute 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; 3) simplification of the Treaties; 4) role of the National 
Parliaments in the European architecture 
21 Com (2002) 247 Comunicazione della Commissione. Un progetto per l’Unione europea, May 22,2002 
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method, the community method. A unitary institutional frame should be introduced, the 
three pillars done away with and QM made the “general procedural rule”.       
In the section: “One project, three fundamental tasks”, three  priorities are identified:  
consolidation of Europe's economic and social model combining prosperity and 
solidarity; the creation of a European space of security and justice; an effective foreign 
policy in keeping with Europe's responsibility as a world power. I shall concentrate on 
the economy and external action which involve important questions of institutional 
balance. 
One of the most far-reaching proposals concerns the coordination of economic policy. 
The Commission has consistently argued that the disjunction between monetary policy, 
the responsibility of the European Central Bank, and economic and budgetary policy, a 
national prerogative, is unsustainable. Under the current system, the Commission can 
make recommendations in regard to the Guidelines on economic policy and the 
administration of the stability Pact. The suggestion is to turn recommendations into 
“proposals”: while the Council may vote down the former by QM, it may change 
proposals only by unanimity.  
The Commission had little success. Or, to be more precise, things have been moving in 
the other direction. Not only has the constitutional Treaty left the distribution of 
authority regarding economic policy unchanged, but recent Council interpretations of 
the stability pact have further diluted budgetary discipline.  
As to foreign policy, the consolidated practice has been that the Executive takes 
responsibility for the civilian aspects of external action trade, aid, etc.  while the 
Council and the High Representative are in charge of the military and diplomatic side.  
In the document under discussion, the Commission takes the view that foreign policy 
cannot be compartmentalized. Diplomatic and military action, justice and police 
coordination, the environment, trade, aid and the external representation of the eurozone 
are part and parcel of one foreign action. Efficacy and the efficient use of means require 
integration. The objective, the Commission add, is neither to communitarize foreign 
policy “which would be incompatible with the emergent European military dimension”, 
nor make it more intergovernmental. A third way has to be found which the 
Commission articulates as follows. 
The “two centers of gravity” the RELEX Commissioner and the High 
Representative must be fused into one office to be located within the Commission.  
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The Commission sees the matter in terms of a hierarchy on top of which it places the 
Community model: while “the intergovernmental logic organizes a first expression of 
the common will of the member states around the high representative”, the Community 
method has “the characteristics necessary to durably define the general interest of the 
Union, from the phase of analysis and initiative to the mobilization of resources and of 
common instruments”. 
A number of adaptations are necessary, to be detailed shortly. But first I would like to 
recall one more argument in favor of the Community method, and that is the 
conjunction in the same body of the “capacity for political initiative” and for carrying it 
out. It “is not conceivable”, the Commission notes, “that the high representative 
presents proposals without identifying the means to put them in practice. Nor is it 
conceivable that a body external to the Commission disposes at will of means and 
instruments of which the Commission guarantees the administration and for which it is 
responsible…”  
What is at stake, then, is the coherence and credibility of Union policy. The question is, 
in addition, one of institutional equity, foreign policy being one more case of 
disjunction between goal-setting (by the Council) and political and financial 
responsibility, which falls on the shoulders of the Commission (see above the discussion 
on the White Paper on Governance).  
We may be brief on other aspects since none of the above proposals has found its way 
into the constitutional Treaty, in which foreign policy continues to be the almost 
exclusive prerogative of the governments and the Council. Unicity of function and 
unicity of office do not imply disregard for the specificity of the CFSP. For one thing, 
diplomatic, economic, military security requires specific procedures. Also, a distinction 
has to be made between foreign policy, on the one hand, and aid and trade. Finally, 
geography, history and the military capacity for intervention in specific regions, the 
Commission notes, create objective differences among   states which is the task of the 
foreign minister to accomodate in his overall foreign policy. 
On the institutional framework, the Commission makes three sets of proposals. Firstly, 
it recommends that the Union and the Communities be merged into one political entity 
provided with juridical personality. A second set concerns the distribution of 
competence. A final cluster deals with the Union’s decision-making structure, including 
more extensive co-decision powers for the EP and the abolition of comitology. 
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The Executive advocates the abolition of the “pillar” structure. This is the solution 
adopted by the Convention even though, as noted, foreign and security policy remains 
governed by principles which radically depart from the Community method. (The same 
is true, incidentally, in the Treaty of Lisbon layout for foreign policy). Prodi also 
recommended the removal of the opting-out clause as incompatible with equality among 
European citizens and an enlarged Union. 
On the question of competence, the Commission’s line has been that no rigid 
classification is needed since most policies have a European and national dimension: it 
all depends, the document notes, on the specific measure. Moreover, a clear-cut 
classification would unnecessarily restrict the Union's scope of activity. Distribution of 
tasks, then, should not be by sector but degree of intensity of Union action, which may 
range from harmonization to “soft” regulation. For some policy areas it might be useful 
to specify the appropriate degree of intervention so as to preserve national competence. 
Precisely because a rigid classification would be inexpedient the Executive recommends 
that specific provisions be introduced into the Treaty “to ensure that the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality are respected”. The Convention decided otherwise and 
the constitutional Treaty lists areas of exclusive competence, concurrent legislation and 
support measures, the same scheme as the one adopted in the Treaty of Lisbon. 
The Commission had better luck on article 308, the object of much criticism. This 
article gives the Union   the necessary operational flexibility even though it may require 
a better definition of the common objectives as set out in article 3 of the EU Treaty. 
The concluding proposal calls for a more coherent division of tasks. European citizens 
would have a better grasp on the Union if each institution were assigned distinct 
responsibility. The proposals are similar to the ones outlined in the White Paper on 
Governance. Firstly, co-decision should become the norm in the making of European 
laws. In the second place, European laws should concentrate on general objectives with 
a clear distinction between the law and what pertains to norms of execution. Finally and 
concomitantly, article 202 should be revised and the Executive and national 
administrations assigned responsibility for the execution of policies and legislation. 
Comitology, in other words, should be radically changed, a long-term aspiration of the 
Commission.   
To conclude. Not only did the draft treaty produced by the Convention prove abortive. 
But as the list of proposals just outlined shows, the Commission obtained gain de cause 
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in very few cases. An analysis of the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), which is beyond the 
purview of this essay, would lead to similar conclusions showing if anything else a 
further involution in terms of integration. 
 
3.8 On the European Parliament: A Changing Balance 
 
 
As I noted at the beginning of this essay, changes in the relations with Strasbourg are 
among the most notable transformations during Prodi's mandate. New powers conferred 
onto the Assembly and “politics”, especially the circumstances surrounding the 
downfall of Santer, explain the mutation. Thus, an institution of uncertain status on 
which the Commission would routinely rely, changed in a relatively short span of time 
into a full-fledged actor, one which inspires respect, indeed fear in the Executive.  
One sign of this is the procedure whereby the Committee on Budgetary Control clears 
the Commission of its obligations with respect to the execution of the Union budget. 
The “discharge”, as the procedure is known, raises real fear and anxiety within the 
Executive as the vote in Parliament approaches. The Commission has adapted to the 
situation in a number of ways, one of which has been the creation of a house organ 
called GAP (Group of parliamentary advisers). GAP is made up of the Commissioners' 
parliamentary liaison officers and meets weekly. It ensures the day-to-day liaison with 
the Assembly, including response to parliamentary amendments to Commission 
proposals, the setting-up of the list of Commissioners who are to attend plenary sessions 
of the EP and other matters. 
I shall confine my remarks to two documents. The first is the EP resolution on the 
White Paper on European Governance, voted in November 200122. It shows the extent 
to which Parliament and the Executive differ in their views as to how “democratize” the 
Union. I shall turn next to the Framework Agreement between the Commission and the 
EP signed by Prodi in July 200023, a good mirror of the changing balance between the 
two institutions. (All references in this paragraph are to these two documents). 
The overall tone of the EP resolution on the White Paper is one of caution if not outright 
rejection of participatory democracy and of a number of other proposals.  Participatory 
                                                          
22 Com (2001) 428 Résolution du Parlement européen sur le Livre blanc de la Commission 
“Gouvernance européenne” 
23 Framework Agreement between the Commission and the European Parliament, 5 July 2000.  Secretary 
General, “Practical Guide to the Framework Agreement”, 16 October 2000 
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democracy “must be introduced cautiously” with a constant eye to the principles of 
“representative democracy, the rule of law and…political accountability” all of which 
would be undermined if “civil society” were given unqualified access to the Union 
decision-making circuits. As for decentralization of Commission tasks, including 
independent agencies, it should not be affected at the expense of Parliament, 
subsidiarity or proportionality. All in all, Parliament turned out to be to an even greater 
degree than the Commission an uncompromising advocate of both the Community 
method and the institutional balance on which it is premised. 
Let us look at some of the provisions in the EP resolution on governance, which is in 
four parts: participation, regulatory agencies, transparency, and involvement of regional 
authorities. 
On participation, Parliament makes three remarks. Organized civil society, “whilst 
important, is inevitably sectoral and cannot be regarded as having its own democratic 
legitimacy, given that representatives are not elected by the people”. Prodi's plea for 
greater involvement of citizens and associations is thus called into question on 
democratic grounds. In the second place, “consultation of interested parties with the aim 
of improving draft legislation can only ever supplement and never replace” the Council 
and Parliament as democratically responsible co-legislators. And thirdly, participatory 
democracy would profit from a more systematic consultation of the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, especially in the early stage of  
legislation. 
The Parliament's main concern with independent agencies, like the recently created 
European Food Authority, is that they may obfuscate the Commission's political 
responsibility. The creation of new authorities should not lead to “a reduction in expert 
and judicial scrutiny by the Commission”; to the same end, agencies must be grounded 
on a “clear legal base”. Nor do the EP's reservations end here. As the document points 
out, the setting-up of such bodies would make the right of codecision and political 
scrutiny by the EP and the Council more difficult, and the Union less transparent. For 
all these reasons, delegation of tasks to agencies must be restricted to purely technical 
decisions and  subject to very detailed regulation.  
On transparency, the Parliament's view is that the most urgent task is to reform the 
operation of the Council whose openness “is a sine qua non for good governance”. The 
resolution stresses the need for the Council to hold its meetings in public when acting in 
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a legislative capacity and for public debates to take place at the start and the end of all 
legislative procedures. In the same vein, Strasbourg regrets that the White Paper does 
not mention the regulations on access to documents, of “paramount importance for the 
achievement of good governance in the Union”. 
The last part of the EP resolution, “Involvement of regional and local authorities”, is 
broader that its title implies since it includes industry's co-regulation. 
On the role of local government in Union governance, the views of Parliament are in 
line with the conservative bent of the document under review. The EP flatly states that 
delegation of powers to regional authorities in the Member States “would undermine the 
basic structure of the Union and be in breach of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality”. Greater involvement of local government should be sought by 
enlisting expertise at regional level within the Member States in the early stage of 
legislation, in addition to consultation with the Committee of the Regions. 
The White Paper contains an ardent plea for industry's co-regulation. Together with 
other devices, including the “open method of coordination”, co-regulation is meant to 
unburden the agenda of the Commission and the manner of its execution. The European 
Parliament has two objections in this respect. Firstly, co-regulation would not guarantee 
the effective exercise of Parliament’s responsibility with respect to either the choice of a 
legal instrument or implementation of the regulation. In the second place, “in no 
circumstances” co-regulation should be made to apply to environmental “targets for 
industry… approved by the Council under agreements between the Commission and 
trade associations which are neither “representative” nor “accountable”. 
To sum up. The EP's stance on the Commission’s proposals for a more open mode of 
governance may be termed conservative in that it rarely departs from consolidated 
practice. Resistance to Commission proposals does not stem solely from the Member 
States, but from Parliament and the adamant defense of its recently acquired powers. 
The Community method turns out to be, in the light of the Parliament's position, both 
the linchpin of Commission powers and a strait-jacket on its capacity for innovation. 
The Framework Agreement between the EP and the Commission aims at introducing a 
higher level of political responsibility and information following the resignation of 
Santer in 1999 and the cases of misconduct which led to the fall of the Commission. It 
integrates a number of commitments made by Prodi in the course of the investiture 
procedure. It does not redesign powers, but regulates the manner in which they are 
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exercized. The Agreement is, genetically and textually, a lopsided document that seeks, 
as stated in paragraph 1, to “reinforce the responsibility and the legitimacy of the 
Commission” and to restore trust and cooperation between the two institutions. 
I shall focus on the most important innovations which may be grouped under a number 
of headings. A first set of steps seeks to strengthen the flow of information so as to 
allow the EP to keep abreast of, and better evaluate Executive action. They range from 
the presentation before the EP of the political program of the Commission at the start of 
a new Executive to semi-annual reports on the implementation of the Commission Work 
Program. Furthermore, the Commission must inform Parliament of its decisions before 
they are passed on to the Press (this applies, for instance, to decisions immediately 
following each College meeting). It is also under obligation to inform Parliament as to 
the implementation of the Executive's internal reform. 
A second and more important set of measures falls under the “suite donnée 
procedure”. Under such scheme, whenever the EP asks the Commission to introduce a 
legislative proposal, the Executive is committed to give appropriate follow-up to such 
request. A parallel obligation applies to parliamentary amendments voted in the course 
of the second reading. If rejected, the Commission must provide reasons why it cannot 
accept such amendments. This set of provisions seeks to reconcile the Executive right of 
initiative and the need to provide Parliament with reasoned explanations. 
Other clauses are meant to enforce political responsibility stricto sensu. One provision 
prescribes that, should Parliament express a vote of censure vis-à-vis a Commissioner, 
the President is bound to take into serious consideration the possibility of his/her 
resignation. In the case of reshuffle or change in portfolios, the Assembly should 
equally and timely be informed. To these engagements, one may add the 
Commissioners’ obligation to attend parliamentary debates on their respective business. 
Perhaps no other clause in the Framework Agreement has given rise to more heated 
debate and controversy than the provision of confidential information to Parliament in 
matters related to its control missions, including décharge; just as no other measure is a 
better proof that we are in the presence of an accord which cuts deeply into the 
autonomy of the Executive. The point at which an internal document reaches the level 
of formalization as to fall under this obligation, is a matter of conjecture. Be as it may, it 
is evident that in discharging this onerous responsibility the Commission must keep a 
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balance between the right of Parliament to receive pertinent information and the 
Executive's legitimate needs of confidentiality. 
To this list, long and incomplete, one should add a cluster of measures which make it 
incumbent for the Commission to keep the EP fully and timely informed on matters in 
which the Assembly has limited powers, including international negotiations, the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). 
Parliament must be informed as to the intention to start an international negotiation and 
on progress in the course of negotiations. And since the aim is to allow the Executive to 
take note of the orientations of the Assembly, the information must be both timely and 
adequate. MEPs may be included as observers in Commission delegations charged with 
international negotiations. As for the CFSP and JHA, the Agreement extends existing 
best practice to these sectors. Here the Executive commitment consists in informing 
Parliament, particularly with respect to initiatives and positions of Member States in the 
CFSP and JHA areas.  
Enough has been said to grasp the content of the Agreement and its political 
significance. It codifies relations at a time of maximum political weakness of the 
Commission. It also signals a trend   in the direction of the further parlamentarization of 
Union life.  
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4. By way of conclusion 
 
A long essay deserves a short conclusion. In assessing Prodi's record we should 
remember that Prodi found a shattered institution. The reordering of internal structures, 
procedures and priorities, on the one hand, and the reassertion of the Commission's 
authority, on the other hand, were not a matter of choice but an institutional imperative. 
In addition to a complex, multi-faceted internal reform, perhaps the most successful 
operation during the five years of his tenure, the relaunching of the institution took the 
form of the vigorous reassertion of the Community method and the underlying 
interinstitutional balance. 
It is here that the institutional and comparative dimension discussed in Part I enters the 
picture. The perception, so clear in Prodi's staff, that the Commission has been “under 
siege”, was no passing phenomenon. The Commission is weak especially in terms of 
political legitimation. It suffers from a chronic disproportion between goals, that is, the 
formulation and execution of common policies under the Treaties, and means, including 
a weak institutional foundation. This is brought out in Part I, in which the political 
system of the European Union is seen against the backdrop of other species of 
“balanced government”, particularly “checks and balances”. The Commission has none 
of the institutional resources and social foundation which allow a constitutional 
authority, say in the USA or Britain, to resist external political pressure. 
This, to my mind, is not a way to a priori absolve the Executive, but to put its efforts in 
context. 
Changes in the institutional system, the focus of this essay, may come about in two 
different contexts: à droit constant, that is, without modification of the Treaties, or 
through Treaty revision. The White Paper on European Governance is a prime example 
of the former mode of innovation, while Executive contribution to the Treaty of Nice 
and to the “constitutional Convention” falls into the latter. The White Paper suffered 
from a number of weaknesses, including its bureaucratic mode of preparation, which are 
investigated in the essay. But a number of other obstacles, some unexpected, stood in 
the way of the proposed changes. The European Parliament, in particular, emerged as a 
stern critic of the Commission and its attempts to innovate in the direction of 
“participatory democracy”. Thus, the Community method, vigorously defended by 
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Parliament, has turned out to be as much a resource in the hands of the Commission as a 
barrier to political reform. 
Nor was success much greater in the case of the Treaty of Nice. None of the major 
proposals advanced by the Commission in view of enlargement found their way into the 
Treaty. This applies equally to the extension of the QM mode of voting in the Council, 
“double majority” (population cum number of member states) as the criterion on which 
to base QM and the proposals meant to lay the foundation for a common economic 
policy. The story of the Convention is partly similar, even though this innovative 
method of Treaty revision followed the lines advocated by the Commission. But, to cite 
just one example, on the crucial question of competence for which the Commission 
recommended no rigid classification, the Executive had to adapt to quite a different 
scheme, one which more sharply delimits its sphere of action. 
While all of the above may not be a sufficient guide for evaluating success and failure 
of the Prodi Commission, it places its record in the appropriate institutional and political 
context. For a more adequate appraisal, we must rely on the historians who have the 
heuristic tools, the degree of removal and wealth of information required for a critical 
judgment on the  Union. 
 
 
 
 
 
 41
5. References 
 
Craig, P. and de Burca, G. (eds.) (1999), The evolution of EU law, Oxford University 
Press 
Craig, P. (1999), “The nature of the Community: integration theory and democratic 
theory. Two discourses passing in the night”, in Craig and de Burca 
G. Cullen, H. and Charlesworth, A. (1999), “Diplomacy by other means: The use of 
legal basis litigation as a political strategy by the European Parliament and Member 
States”, Common Market Law Review, 36, 1243-1270 
De Burca, G. (1999), “The institutional development of the European Union: a 
constitutional analysis”, in Craig and de Burca  
Eriksen, O.E., Joerges, C. and Neyer, J. (eds.) (2003), European Governance, 
Deliberation and the Quest for Democratization, ARENA Report No. 02/2003 and 
European University Institute, Oslo 
Fabbrini, S. (2004), “L'Unione europea come democrazia composita?”, Rivista italiana 
di scienza politica, 1/2004, 14-41 
Graziano, L. (2001), Lobbying, pluralism and democracy, Palgrave 
Graziano, L. (2002), Le lobbies, Laterza (2nd ed. 2007) 
Lenaerts, K. and Verhoeven, A. (2000), Institutional balance as a guarantee for 
democracy in EU governance, Course at the Academy of European Law, Florence, 
July 
Madison, J., The Federalist n. 10 and 51 
Monnet, J. (1976), Mémoires, Fayard  
Montesquieu, Esprit des lois 
Pitkin, H. (1967), The Theory of Representation, University of California Press, 
Berkeley 
Ponzano, P. (1966), “La prassi del processo decisionale nella Comunità europea”, Il 
diritto dell'Unione europea”, n. 4 
Ponzano, P. (2000), “Les relations entre le COREPER et la Commission”, Il diritto 
dell'Unione europea, n. 1 
 42
QUADERNS DE TREBALL / Working papers 
 
01/90 Alabau Oliveres, Mercè: Le contrôle externe des cours de comptes de l'Europe communautaire 
 
02/90 Munich Gasa, Jaume: La subjetividad internacional de la Comunidad Económica Europea: especial 
referencia al Treaty Making Power en materia de pesca 
 
03/90 Pons de Vall, Marta: El derecho de patentes y la libre circulación de mercancías en la CEE: estudio 
sectorial de la industria farmacéutica española 
 
04/90 Flores Gual, Elena: 1,2% de PNB pour le budget de la Communauté: un plancher ou un plafond? 
 
05/91 Pascual de Sans, Angels; Cardelús, Jordi: Elements per a l'estudi de la mobilitat de personal qualificat 
 
06/91 López García, Miguel-Angel: Cotizaciones sociales e imposiciones sobre la nómina: una nota y una 
comparación tentativa España-CEE 
 
07/91 Morata Tierra, Francesc: La implementación regional de las políticas comunitarias. Adecuación normativa, 
organización administrativa y gestión de los Fondos estructurales 
 
08/93 Pasqual Rocabert, Joan: The Problem of Future Generations in Europe: Some Economic Issues. 
 
09/93  Montañà, Miquel: The U.S. / E.C. Agricultural Export Disputes. A Legal Perspective 
 
10/93   Massot, Albert: El marc competencial intern i el marc comunitari agro-rural per a l'aplicació del Plà d'Espais 
d'Interès Natural (PEIN) al Pallars 
 
11/93 Gardeñes Santiago, Miquel: Los obstáculos técnicos al comercio de productos industriales; una reflexión 
 
12/93 Rovira Pato, Jaume: Estudio de la evolución del sector aereo (tarifas) ante el derecho comunitario: 
desarrollos recientes (1989-1993) 
 
13/93 Pauleau, Christine: L'incidence du droit communautaire sur la création et le fonctionnement des entreprises 
communes 
 
14/93 Garcia Vidal, Montserrat: La igualdad de retribución entre hombre y mujer en la Comunidad Economómica 
Europea: un estudio relacional entre el Reino Unido y España 
 
15/93 Bacaria, Jordi: Improving Predictability by Supra-national Monetary Rules?: Reflections on the European 
Monetary Union 
 
16/94 Brandts, Jordi; López García, Miguel-Angel: La armonización fiscal indirecta en Europa: un panorama 
desde el análisis económico 
 
17/95 Guasch, Joan: Recherche de la dimension réelle de la prise en compte des interêts des consommateurs 
dans le cadre de la protection juridique communautaire de la qualité et des dénominations de vente au sein 
des politiques agricole commune et de Marché Interieur de l’Union Européenne 
 
18/95 Jiménez, Claudia: El papel de la CEE en la regulación internacional del comercio de los textiles 
 
19/96 Peters, Sanjay: Core-Periphery analysis of Regional Economic Integration: A Case Study of Spain’s 
Accession to the European Union 
 
20/96 Montañà, Miquel: Las Comunidades Europeas y el sistema GATT-OMC 
 
21/97 Margallo, Emilio: La fiscalidad ecológica y el mercado interior en la Unión Europea 
 
22/97 Guillén, Mònica: Les estratègies de les empreses transnacionals. Un estudi metodològic per l’anàlisi del 
sector automotriu a Espanya 
 
23/97 Torras, Josepa: Los Acuerdos Euromediterráneos de Asociación con Marruecos y Túnez. Una cooperación 
adaptada a los nuevos tiempos 
 43
 
24/97 Queralt, Arnau; Riera, Pere: The Environmental Performance of Firms in Spain and Some Eastern 
Euroepan Transition Economies 
 
25/97 Riera, Pere; Saiz, Albert: Environmental Economic Policy in Spain: Environmental Policy at Micro-level 
 
26/98 Bacaria, Jordi; Chortareas, Georgios; Kyriacou, Andreas: Districting and the European System of Central 
Banks 
 
27/98 Fernández, Tatiana: ¿Asegura el Pacto de Estabilidad la disciplina presupuestaria de la Unión Europea? 
 
28/98 Sheehan, Rosalyn: Discussion on the “Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy”: 
Where to from here? 
 
29/98 Bacaria, Jordi; Chortareas, Georgios; Kyriacou, Andreas: Los bancos centrales nacionales en el sistema 
europeo de bancos centrales 
 
30/98 Pi i Llorens, Montserrat: El Tribunal de Primera Instancia de las Comunidades Europeas a los diez años de 
su creación 
 
31/99 Alós Pérez-Yarza: Principio de subsidiariedad: proyección y desarrollo en el ámbito del derecho económico 
de la Comunidad Europea 
 
32/99 Tambou, Olivia: Le consorcio Bidassoa Txingudi: premier organisme public franco-espagnol de coopération 
transfrontalière entre entités locales 
 
33/00 Morata, Francesc: La europeización de las políticas regionales de desarrollo agrícola y rural 
 
34/00 Fernàndez, Andrea; Ulied, Andreu: Dinámicas locacionales de grandes empresas industriales en el Área 
Metropolitana de Barcelona 
 
35/00 Beltrán, Susana:  Algunas reflexiones sobre los acuerdos exteriroes de las regiones de Europa occidental 
 
36/00  Johansson, Elisabeth: Subregionalization in Europe’s Periphery: the Northern and Southern Dimensions of 
the European Union’s Foreign Policy 
 
37/01 Ferrer, Albert: Libre circulación de nacionales de terceros estados y miembros de la familia en la Unión 
Europea 
 
38/02 Vilà Costa, Blanca (coord.): El horizonte institucional de la UE tras la conferencia intergubernamental (de 
Biarritz a Niza) – Jornada científica 
39/02 Barbé, Esther; Morata, Francesc (coords.): La Presidencia Española de la Unión Europea y el futuro de 
Europa 
40/02 Barbé, Esther (coord.): España y la política exterior de la UE. Entre las prioridades españolas y los 
desafíos del contexto internacional 
41/03 Mestres, Laia: Liderazgo y Hegemonía en la Unión Europea: Francia y Alemania ante la CIG-2000 y el 
debate sobre el futuro de la UE 
 
42/04 Miralles, Débora: An Instrumental Analysis of the European Union’s Capability to Act in Conflict Response 
 
43/05 Font, Núria: Turkey’s accession to the EU: interests, ideas and path dependence 
 
44/05 Morata, Francesc; Ramon, Ricard: Regiones y Constitución Europea 
 
45/06 Arregui, Javier: Cooperative vs. Non-Cooperative Mechanisms in the EU decision making 
 
46/06 Fernández Pasarín, Ana Mar: El neoinstitucionalismo como instrumento de análisis del proceso de 
integración europea 
 
47/07 Ysàs Molinero, Helena: El diàleg social a la Constitución europea 
 44
48/08 Schout, Adriaan; Jordan, Andrew: EU-EPI, Policy Co-ordination and New Institutionalism 
 
Publicació de les Actes de les Jornades d’Estudi 
 
I Jornada d’estudi: “La cooperación entre instituciones comunitarias e internas en la aplicación del derecho 
comunitario de la competencia en el mercado interior: ¿hacia un perfil descentralizador”, 20 de maig de 
1993. 
 
II Jornada d’estudi: “El individuo ante el derecho comunitario: evolución de la jurisprudencia en el Tribunal de 
Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas”, 18 de juny de 1993. 
 
 
 45
L’Institut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus és un consorci integrat per la Generalitat de 
Catalunya, a través del Patronat Català Pro Europa i la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 
la constitució del qual fou aprovada per Decret 216/1992 de Presidència i decret 134/1992 
del Departament d’Ensenyament de la Generalitat de Catalunya. L’IUEE té personalitat 
jurídica pública per al desenvolupament de les seves finalitats. 
 
Aquestes són fonamentalment: a) l’estudi a nivell superior i la investigació en temes 
europeus; b) l’ensenyament de les matèries relacionades amb els problemes europeus i, 
especialment, els estudis de tercer cicle; c) l’intercanvi científic i d’informació amb altres 
institucions similars; d) la difusió i promoció dels estudis europeus. 
 
Els Quaderns de Treball tenen com a finalitat difondre els resultats de la recerca en 
temes europeus i comunitaris per tal d’estimular el debat i l’intercanvi científics. 
 
El Instituto Universitario de Estudios Europeos es un consorcio integrado por la Generalitat 
de Catalunya, a través del Patronat Català Pro Europa y la Universidad Autónoma de 
Barcelona, la constitución del cual fue aprobada por Decreto 216/1992 de Presidencia y 
Decreto 134/1992 del Departament d’Ensenyament de la Generalitat de Catalunya. El IUEE 
tiene personalidad jurídica pública para el desarrollo de sus finalidades. 
 
Éstas son fundamentalmente: a) el estudio a nivel superior y la investigación en temas 
europeos; b) la enseñanza de las materias relacionadas con los problemas europeos y, 
especialmente, los estudios de tercer ciclo; c) el intercambio científico y de información con 
otras instituciones similares; d) la difusión y promoción de los estudios europeos. 
 
Los Quaderns de Treball tienen como finalidad difundir los resultados de la investigación en 
temas europeos y comunitarios para estimular el debate y el intercambio científicos. 
 
 
 
Si desitgeu rebre els Quaderns de Treball o d’altres publicacions de l’Institut, solliciteu-los a 
l’adreça següent i us el farem arribar per correu contra reembors / Si desea recibir los 
Quaderns de Treball u otras publicaciones del Instituto, solicítelos a la siguiente dirección y 
le serán enviados por correo contra reembolso: 
 
Institut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 
Edifici E-1 
08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona) 
T.: 93 581 20 16 
Fax: 93 581 30 63 
c-elec: iuee@uab.es 
 
Preu / Precio:  
Quaderns de Treball: 6,01€ 
 Les trameses per correu incrementaran aquest preu / Los envíos por correo incrementarán 
este precio:  3,00€ (España/Espanya); 6,00€ (Europa); 9,00€ (altres / otros) 
 
Disponibilitat / Disponibilidad 
Molts Quaderns de Treball es troben exhaurits, mentre que els darrers números es troben 
penjats en format electrònic a la nostra web. Podeu consultar-los a l’apartat Publicacions de 
la nostra web (www.iuee.eu) / Muchos Quaderns de Treball están agotados, mientras que 
los últimos números se encuentran en formato electrónico en nuestra web. Puede 
consultarlos en el apartado Publicaciones de nuestra web (www.iuee.eu) 
 
 

